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This paper is an attempt to estimate empirically the
credibility of monetary policies and the reputation of central
banks participating in the EMS. The main focus of interest is
on the ' EMS-credibility hypothesis' - that is, that the EMS
itself in connection with the high anti-inflation reputation of
the German Bundesbank is responsible for the inflation
reduction and convergence which member countries have
experienced. The empirical approach taken in this paper is
based on the theoretical models of Backus d Driffill [11985a1,
(1985b1] and Barro ( 1986b1, in which rational expectations of
economic agents with respect to future monetary policy are used
to derive measures of governments' reputation for being 'hard-
nosed' or 'wet' in his commitment to fight inflation from the
public's rational expectations about future monetary policy. In
forming inflation expectations, rational agents pursue a
Bayesian learning strategy whereby the probability that the
central bank sets the monetary growth rate such that the
domestic inflation rate follows a stationary stochastic process
with both constant mean and finite variance is continuously
updated. for truly 'hard-nosed' monetary authorities this
probability should be close to one and the expected rate of
money growth should be close to zero. However, reputation is
affected by the actual course of policy and a rise in inflation
rates leads to higher expected future inflation, which lowers
the reputation of the central bank for being hard-nosed. The
paper derives and compares time-varying estimates of reputation
for all 8 EMS participants and some major non-member countries
and finds some empirical support for the ' EMS-credibility
hypothesis'.
1. Introduction.
Since the early 1980's there has been a vast increase in literature
on the EMS. A number of recent contributions focus on the so-called
'EMS-inflation hypothesis', according to which the EMS itself is
responsible for the inflation reduction and convergence experienced in
all member countries. No consensus has yet been reached on this issue.
In evaluating the empirical evidence on the EMS-inflation hypothesis
Rogoff (1985) concludes:
.......................................
1) Paper completed during my visit to the Center for Economic Research
(CentER) at Tilburg University in September 1988. I should like to thank
Torben Andersen, John Driffill, Patrick Minford, Theoodor Nijman and the
participants of the CentER's economic and econometric seminar for help-
full comments and discussions.
- 2 -
...there is no evidence whatsoever of any convergence between
France's, Germany's and Italy's inflation rates. ... Even if
French, German and Italian inflation rates do ultimately
converge at a low level, one should be cautious in attributing
this success to the existence of the EMS."[Rogoff (19851.
p.96.]
The same conclusion is derived by Collins (19871. who states:
"...all countries tended to have lower inflation rates after
1979, but there was little difference between the EMS and
nonEMS countries after 1979. ... Between 1979 and 1986 there
was an impressive reduction and convergence of inflation rates
among EMS members. However coincidence alone is not enough to
determine causality. The fact that little convergence occurred
during the first half of the system makes claims especially
suspect." [Collins (19871, p. 27, 28.]
This pessimism about the achievements of the EMS in its early stage
from 1979-1982 is shared by Ungerer, Evans R Nyberg, OECD (19831:
"...The lack of coordination of policies has been reflected in
a lack of convergence of economic performances and, in
particular, of costs and prices. An opinion held by many,
however, is that the existence of the constraints imposed by
the EMS have helped to prevent a greater divergence..." [OECD
(19831, p. 10.]
Schioppa 119851, in considering the period 1979-1984, is slightly more
optimistic about the successes of the EMS, especially in its later
phase:
"...in terms of price stability the EMS can only claim some
modest results. ... Consumer price inflation during the five
EMS years did not come down in some EMS member countries
compared with the pre EMS period, although the average
inflation rate of the member countries was reduced. ...
Starting in 1980 the disciplinary effects began to exert
pressure, the average inflation rate fell..." [Schioppa (19851,
D. 346-349.]
In contrast to much of the evidence referred to above, De Grauwe (1985)
suggests that compared with other OECD countries the EMS countries have
been able to lengthen and soften the adjustment process towards lower
inflation rates when compared with other OECD countries. Artis (19871,
however, finds that based on data up to 1987 the reduction in both the
level of and the dispersion in inflation rates is somewhat larger for
non-EMS countries than for EMS countries. Adding further observations
may yet again alter this result in favour of the EMS. This clearly shows
the weakness of such policy evaluations, based on comparisons of the
period-averages or time-paths of pre and post EMS inflation rates (and
other key economic variables) for EMS member and non-member countries.
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The present study takes a different approach and focuses
exclusively on the credibility and reputation effects resulting from
membership in the EMS. The analysis below concentrates on what I shall
call the 'EMS-credibility hypothesis', that the high anti-inflation
reputation of the German Bundesbank in connection with a binding
commitment to EMS-membership has provided the exchange rate pegging
policies of high inflation member countries with counterinflation
credibility, and hence enabled these economies to move to a low-
inflation reputational equilibrium, which without EMS-membership would
not have besn credible. Some references to this EMS-credibility
hypothesis will be given below.
As Artis (1987) and Artis 8 Miller (19871 stress, the EMS has been
consciously used as part of a counterinflationary framework and this
was intended from the start. While there is no formal leader within the
EMS, it is commonly agreed that on the inflation front Germany is the
de-facto or acknowledged leader:
"...Since Germany had the best reputation for price stability,
there was a commonalty to converge to the German inflation
rate." [Frenkel 8 Goldstein (1988), p.15.]
With Germany as the low inflation centre or anchor of the EMS, the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, which aims at keeping the
bilateral exchange rates of the EMS-member countries within their
agreed bands, thus provides the official EMS exchange rate targets with
their counterinflation credibility. As Fischer (1987a1 emphasizes, the
main motivation for high inflation countries to peg their bilateral
exchange rates with the mark is therefore the move towards a
reputational low-inflation equilibrium within the EMS, an equilibrium
which would not be credible without the binding commitment of EMS-
membership:
'...The EMS is currently an arrangement for France and Italy
to purchase a commitment to low inflation by accepting German
monetary policy." [Fischer (1987a1.]
Even for potential future participants in the ERM of the EMS these
reputational aspects have been put forward as a major argument in
favour of the EMS:
"...For a country contemplating the relative merits of
independent exchange rate targeting and adherence to the EMS,
the credibility factor may weigh decisively in favour of the
latter option." [Artis (1987), p. 195.]
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This argument is, however, only valid if the country in r,uestion - in
this case Great Britain - has a reputation for pursuing anti-inflation
policies which is currently lower than that of Germany. As Sachs and
Wyplosz (1987) argue, it is obvious that Britains current economic
policy after almost a decade of Thatcherism is sufficiently austere by
itself, but EMS membership could be viewed as one avenue to bind the
actions of a successor government.2) However, entering the EMS with a
high reputation for anti-inflation policies might be undesirable since
the loss in autonomy over monetary policy can result in a depletion of
the stock of credibility which has accumulated over recent years. Such
concerns are expressed in Vaubel (1985) and in Vaubel's discussion of a
paper by Hellwig 6 Neumann (19871. Vaubel states that the EMS has hung
like a millstone around the mark's neck 3) and adds that within the
German institutional framework membership in the EMS provided the
Federal Government of Chancellor Schmidt and his conservative successor
Kohl de facto with control over monetary policy of the de jure
autonomous central bank, and may after all have been the most important
motive for Germany to join the EMS.
Further doubts about the German Bundesbank's gains from the current
EMS arrangement are expressed in Giavazzi d Giovannini (19871. They
describe the EMS as a system of managed exchange rates where the mark
effectively plays the role of the nth currency and the other EMS
members are free, at least in part, to influence their own bilateral
exchange rates with the mark. When faced with a common price shock from
outside, such as a dollar appreciation, the non-German EMS countries
have an incentive to appreciate their currencies against the mark, thus
exporting some of their inflation to Germany and hence undermining the
Bundesbank's anti-inflation reputation.4) In addition, Henderson d
Canzoneri (1988) provide further theoretical arguments indicating that
it might not be in the German interest to have foreign countries pegging
their exchange rates to the mark.
Arguments in favour of joining the EMS as a low inflation country
with high anti-inflation reputation are províded by Frenkel R Goldstein
(19881. They describe the EMS as a system of informal hegemony where
Germany exports price-stability as well as anti-inflation credibility.
Since the other members are "tying their hands" on domestic
.............................~.--..-~--
2) On this point see Sachs d Wyplosz (19871, p. 295.
3) See Vaubel in the discussion of Hellwig 6 Neumann (19871, p. 141.
4) See Giavatzi 8 Giovannini (1987), p. 476.
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monetary policy and since realignments do not always provide full
compensation for past inflation differentials, the resulting real
appreciation for the high inflation countries acts as a disincentive to
inflation, while low inflation countries benefit from improved
competitiveness, which provides some compensation for their export of
anti-inflation credibility.5)
To summarize the above arguments, the EMS can be viewed as an
institutional framework within which high inflation countries with low
anti-inflation credibility can increase their reputation and pursue
credible anti-inflationary policies. With respect to the low inflation
countries with high counterinflation reputations two outcomes of the
EMS are possible: under fully cooperative realignments, low inflation as
well as high counterinflation reputation will persist; under non-
cooperative, 'beggar-thy-neighbour' realignments, however, an increase
in inflation rates and a loss in anti-inflation reputation are likely.
Which outcome actually results from the EMS is therefore an empirical
question and will be dealt with below.
Th~ remainder of the paper is organi2ed as follows: In section 2 a
rudimentary model of the price level effects of monetary policy, both
in and outside of the institutional framework of the EMS, is developed.
Since this paper is the first empirical attempt to quantify empiricalty
some measure of credíbility or reputation in the context of the EMS, a
simple time-series model is used to extract signals about the tightness
of monetary policy and policymakers' counterinflation reputations from
observable consumer price data. The signal-extraction algorithm
employed is the multi-process Kalman filter (MPKF1, which
is taken from Weber (1988b) and briefly reviewed in appendix A. The most
relevant part of the MPKF in the context of the present paper is its
Bayesian probability learning, which can be viewed as the empirical
counterpart of the Bayesian learning strategies used in Backus 8
Driffill [11985a1, (1985b1] and Barro (1986b) and is described in
section 3. Section 3 also defines our measures for policymakers' anti-
inflation reputation and section 4 presents the empirical estimates for
all 8 EMS member countries and 5 selected non-member countries. Finally,
some conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented in
section 5.
.......................................
5) See Frenkel b Goldstein (19881, p. 15.
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2. The Model.
In their attempt to explain the apparent inflationary bias of
market economies in a natural rate model, Barro 8 Gordon [11983a1.
(1983b1] put forward a macromodel in which low inflation is dynamically
inconsistent in the sense of Kydland b Prescott (1977) and represents a
non-credible policy if the government is known to care about output.
This inferiority of the time-inconsistent Nash Solution relative to the
time-consistent solution with binding policy commitments reflects the
more general fact that in game theoretical models the non-cooperative
equilibrium need not be Pareto optimal.
Backus b Driffill [(1985a1, (1985b1] and Barro (1986b) extend the
work of Barro b Gordon to situations where the public is uncertain about
the preferences of the government, in particular, whether or not it
cares about output (and unemploymentl. Thus, when the government
announces its intention to fight inflation regardless of the output
costs, the public is uncertain whether this is in fact the case or
whether it is simply an attempt to manipulate their expectations. In the
following section such a model of monetary policy in the presence of a
sceptical public is developed.
2.1. Public and Policy~sker's Preferences
As in Barro b Gordon 11983b1, aggregate output lyt) is determined
by a Phillips curve with natural rate properties:
(1) Yt L Yn f (xt-xtl .
where yn is the natural rate, and xt and xL are actual and expected
changes in the Drice level.
Expectations are assumed to be formed rationally in the sense of
Muth (1961) and defined to be of the least-squares error type. In Barro
b Gordon [11983a1, (1983b1] this implies that the public resists being
fooled, as can be formalized by the objective (payoff) function:
(21 Uplxt,xtl - (xt-xt)~ ,
which the public attempts to minimize.
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Following Barro 8 Gordon [11983a1, (1983b1], the government is
assumed to maximize a policy preference function Uglxt,xt) each period.
With respect to Ug(xt,xtl, it is postulated that the government cares
about both output and inflation, which implies the general objective
function:
(3a) U91xt,xtl - 2 xt . bt IYL-YnIZ .
(3d) bt - bt t zt , EIzt1-0,Elzt)~-a2~,
with bt as a time-varying preference parameter, postulated to be the
sum of a systematic component (btl and a random component zt. The error-
term zt is defined as an independently normally distributed random
variable with zero mean and constant finite variance (oZ 1. The random:
component thus reflects the fact that the public can only observe a
noisy signal about the government's true preferences.61 At the present,
no further assumptions about the systematic component bt, which could be
constant (bt-bt-1-b) as in Barro 8 Gordon [11983a1, (1983b1] or follow
a non-stationary time-path (bt-bt l~zt) as in Cukierman R Meltzer
[119831, (1986a), (1986b1], are made. However, following Backus 8
Driffill [11985a1, 11985b11. Barro (1986b) and Weber (1988c) two
different types of governments are introduced into the analysis:
A'wet government' is defined as one which cares about both
inflation and output, but places a stronger emphasis on its output
target. In terms of the objective function 12) above, this corresponds
to a large value of bt and hence bt (btl, which can be formalized as:
(4) U91xt'xt) - 2 xt-1 4 bt (xt-xt12 .
In the context of the Barro 11986b1 model such a wet government is
unable to make a binding commitment to low inflation policies.
A'hard-nosed government' on the other hand is assumed to care
mainly about inflation, which in terms of the objective function (3a,b)
implies a low value of bt and hence bt (btl:
.....................................~-
6) I assume that the government knows the current value of this
disturbance, but the public only knows the stochastic laws driving this
process. For a similar concept of disguising one's true preferences by
adding a noisy signal see Cukierman d Meltzer [11983), (1986b)] in their
analysis of strategically biased money supply announcements.
-B-
151 U9fxt'xtl - 2 xt-1 ' bt Ixt-xt12 .
The wet [hard-nosed) government aims at maximizing objective function
(4) [I51). General equilibrium is then characterized by:
(6) xt - bt , xt - Et-lxt - bt ,
if the public faces a hard-nosed government, and by:
(7) xt - bt ' xt - Et-ixt - bt '
if the government is known to be wet. Note that here a hard-nosed
government has less incentive to inflate, regardless of the public's
expectations. In the context of the Barro (1986b) model, such a hard-
nosed government i s one which can make a binding commitment to a low-
inflation policy in each period.
Now it is assumed that the public does not know exactly at each
point in time what type of government is in office. However, an
objective probability distribution exists, whereby the objective
probability for a hard-nosed policymaker is given by (1-qt) and the
corresponding probability for a wet Dolicymaker is qt. Due to the
stochastic nature of policymaker's preferences and given that inflation
is a non-dichotomous variable, the public can infer the true type of
government only slowly by observing actual prices and revising its
subjective estimate Et-lqt of the above probability in each period.
Hence, faced with the uncertainty about the type of policymaker in
office, the Dublic's expectations are required to fulfill the
equilibrium condition:
(81 xt - Et-lxt - Et-1ll-qt) Et-lbt } Et-lqt Et-lbt '
and are a probability weighted average of the expectations of the low-
inflation equilibrium Ixt-bi) and the high-inflation equilibrium
Ixt-btl.
In order to quantify these expectations empirically, a measure for
the subjective probability Et-lqt' which may be interpreted as the
reputation of a government for being hard-nosed, is required. Since
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actual inflation xt in this model always reveals a noisy signal about
the hard-nosed (wet) government's true preferences bt (bt) and since
bt~bt holds, the application of a suitable signal-extraction procedure
to observable price data can yield such a measure for the government's
reputation once a model is specified for the time-paths for the true
preferences of a hard-nosed (bt) or wet (bt) government. Given the
results from above, the specification of the time-paths of bt and bt
corresponds to specifying time-paths for the target inflation rate
under both types of government, to which I shall now turn.
2.2. National Monetary Policies, Prices and the F?IS.
In order to characterize the inflation process under a low-
inflation government in an economy with flexible exchange rates, a low-
order 'dynamic linear model' for ob~ervable domestic prices
considered:
(9a) Pt - mt 4 vt . EIvt1-0,ElvtlZ-a~,
(9b) mt - mt-1
` gt t nt , Elnt)-O,E(nt)2-a~,
(9c) gt - 9t-1 ' g .
pt is
which relates the observable domestic price level (pt) to the domestic
money stock (mt) via a stochastic quantity equation, with vt as an
independently normally distributed error-term with mean zero and
constant finite variance a~. lnflation or changes in the price level
(xt-pt-pt-1) are stochastically related to changes in the nominal money
stock (gt-mt-mt 1). For the 'hard-nosed' government money growth is
assumed to be the sum of a controllable component gt, regarded for
simplicity as a constant, and an uncontrollable component nt, defined to
be independently normally distributed with zero mean and constant finite
2variance a .n
On the other hand, the 'dynamic linear model', which characterizes
the observable domestic prices pt of a'wet' or strongly inflationary
government is represented by assuming higher-order processes, such as:
pt - mt a vt .
mt - mt-1 ~ gt . nt .
9t - gt-1 . dt . rt .






where th~ change in the controllabte rate of money 9rowth gt is now
allowed to follow a random walk with a stochastic drift term dt, which
itself follows a random walk. The two error-terms rt and st are also
defined to be independently normaliy distributed with zero mean and
constant finite variances ar and os respectively. Note that for
dt-dt-1-0 and or-a5-0, however, the controllable money growth is
constant [gi-gt-1-gw (~gh)J and the observable price level series pt is
determined by a difference stationary stochastic process.
Under flexible exchange rates the foreign country is assumed to
have a similar price determination equation, which for the more general
case of a strongly inflationary foreign government is given by:
pt - mt i vt . Elvt)-O.EIvt)z-a~~
mt - mt-1 t gt ~ nt , Elnt)-O,EInt)Z-o~~
gt - gt-1 ' dt ; rt , EIrt1-0,ElrtlZ-ar~
d" - d~ 4 s' , E(r')-O,EIr')2-azt t-1 t t t s~
where the superscript "~" characterizes the foreign country's
variables.
Under a fixed exchange rate (or adjustable Deg) arrangement like
the EMS with an explicitly low-inflation centre country ( Germany), the
n-1 non-German EMS member countries (with higher inflation) are assumed
to peg their exchange rates to the low-inflation centre country on the
basis of a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) condition:
(12) xpt - pt et '
where ét is the official bilateral nominal exchange rate in terms of
the foreign country's currency (Hfll per units of the domestic
country's currency (DMI. For simplicity it is assumed that ét-ét-1-é
holds for all t except the realignment dates, where ét-ét-l.kt holds.
Hence, each realignment (ktl can be interpreted as a permanent price
level shock in the non-centre EMS countries. Under such an exchange rate










mt ét i vt , EIvt1-0,Elvtlz-a~~,
mt-1 } gt } nt , EInt1-0,Elnt)Z-a~ ,
gt-1
. dt . rt , E(rt1-0,Elrtlz-ar ,
dt-1 } st , EIst1-0,ElstlZ-as .
Under this exchange rate arrangement the high-inflation countries can
therefore reduce their inflation rates (for gLcgt) by fixing their n-1
exchange rates with the low-inflation centre country, which continues
to pursue an independent monetary policy.
3. Expectations, Learning and Policy~akers' Reputation.
3.1. The Public's Expectations.
In the derivation of an empirical measure of the policymaker's
reputation for being 'wet' or 'hard-nosed', a model of the public's
price level expectation formation process is essential. In order to
clarify the approach taken here, it is assumed for the moment that the
dynamic linear model (9a) to (9c) describes the observable domestic
price level series, and that gt-0 holds for all t. In this case, the
dynamic linear model (9a) to (9c) is equivalent to the difference
stationary time series model pt-nt.vtvt-1. This in turn corresponds to
an ARIMA (0,1,1) time series model pt-11-d~Blut, with B as the back-
shift operator, dl as a moving-average parameter and ut as an
independently normally distributed error-term with mean zero and
constant finite variance xt. As outlined in Weber (1988a1, the rational
expectation of pt given a~i0 and a~~0 then follows as:
(14) Pt - Pt-1 ~ d~ (Pt-1 - pt-1) .
where d~ is a non-linear function of the two variances a~ and a~. For
the sake of simplicity, let us now assume that a'hard-nosed' government
is characterized by a~-0 and o~i0, while a 'wet' government is
characterized by a~~0 and a~-0. The rational expectations of the price
level pt under a hard-nosed government is then given by:
(151 . .pt - pt-1 '
which implies d-0 in equation (141 above. The corresponding rational~
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expectations of pt under a wet government result as:
(16) pt a pt-1 '
which implies d~-1 in equation (141. Given the public's subjective
probability qt for the occurrence of a'wet' government, the
probability weighted average of the two expectations (15) and (16)
follows as: and can be interpreted as a time-varyíng rather than fixed
error-learning process. The optimality of fixed error-learning processes
(qt-d1) is derived in Muth (1960) and used in Cukierman b Meltzer
[119831, (1986a1, (1986b1J in the context of deriving a measure for the
credibility of monetary policy announcements. The time-varying version
(qt-d~t) of the error-correction model is derived by Turnovsky (19691 in
a Bayesian learning context and by Friedman (19791 in the context of
optimal-least squares learning and Kalman filtering. The Bayesian MSKF
used here combines both forms of learning and estimates the probability
qt (1-qtl which is used in Backus b Driffill [(1985a1, (1985b1] and
Barro (1986b) as a measure of the government's reputation for being wet
(hard-nosedl.
For the analysis of real world price data and policy credibility,
however, the dynamic linear model (9a) to (9c1 is too restrictive,
because it requires the expected inflation rate to be constant and
defines a hard-nosed policymaker as one who forces prices to follow a
stationary stochastic time-path. Thus, in order to study the deflation
process during the EMS period, the more general dynamic linear model
(lla) to (lldl is used and the more realistic definitions of 'hard-
nosed' or 'wet' governments from section 2 are adopted.
In the general case with independently normally distributed random
variables vt, nt, rt and st in the dynamic linear model Iila) to (lld)
the third difference of the Drice level series pt follows a stationary
stochastic process:
(17) e~ pt st . rt - rt-1 ` nt - 2nt-1 ` nt-2
a vt - 3vt-1 ` 3vt-2 - vt-3 '
and is equivalent to an ARiMA (0,3,3) time series model:
(181 A'pt - ( 1- d1B - dZB~ - d~B~ 1 xt ,
- 13 -
with d, d and d as three moving-average parameters. Deriving thef z ~
autocovariance functions of the dynamic linear model and the time





z zav - d ~ ax ,
a~ - - (dz - d~d~ . 6d~1 ax ,
a~ - (d~ - dz[d~adz] - 4[dz-dtd~] 3 9d~) ax
as - (1 - d~ - dz - d~lz aX ,
which can be used to find the moving-average parameters d~, dz and d~
as functions of the error-variances a~, a~, ar and as. Furthermore, by
taking A'pt-11-BI~Pt-pt-3pt-1`3pt-2-pt-3 ~nto consideration, equation
(19) can be modified to:
(20) pt s Pt-1 ~( pt-1 - pt-2 1} 1~t-1 - ept-2 1
a(3-d~) ( Pt-1 - pt-1 1-(3.dz) l Pt-2
~ (1-dl) ( Api-2 - Apt-3 I .
pt-2 1
which for given values of the moving-average parameters dl, dz and d~
in the intervals Ocdlc3 and -3cdzc0 and Ocd~cl and for a normalized
variance of the prediction errors IE[pt-pt]zzxt-l) implies the following
four pure process specifications:
(a) purely transitory level shocks with a~-1 and a~-ar-a5-0 and hence
d~-3, dz--3, d~-1 and aX-1.
(b) purely per~anent level shocks with a~-1 and a~-a~-a5-0 and hence
d-2, d--1, d-0 and aX-1;
1 2 3
(c) p~rely per~anent first difference shocks with or-1 and a~-a~-a5-0
or d-1, d-d -0 and ax-1;i z ~
(d) purely per~anent second difference shocks with a5-1 and a~-a~-ar-0
~
or dt-dz-d3-0 and ax-1;
In the specification of the multi-process filter (outlined in the
appendix) it is assumed that these four alternative process models are
sufficient to cover the range of possible stochastic patterns of the
price level series. Specifically, it is postulated that the four
alternative models, characterized by a superscript j Ifor all
j-1,2,3,41. differ only in the specification of the variances a~`~',
z~~i zi~i zi~,an , ar and a of the dynamic linear model [or the moving-s
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average terms d~, dz and d3 of the corresDOnding time series modelJ, and
that at each poínt in time t[with t-11,2,...,N1] each model has a
certain probability Rt~~.
In order to capture the possibility of process-switching, such as
adopting counterinflation policies by entering the EMS, the observable
process pt 1 in period t-1 may be described by model i[denoted by Mt~l
for all i(-1,2,3,4)], and the Drocess pt in period t is represented by
model j[denoted by Mt~~ for all j1-1,2,3,411. Thus, for a possible
process-switch a prediction on the basis of all models i in period t-1
with the different specification of all models j[denoted by Mtl'~' for
all i,j1-1,2,3,4]] is required. The probability of such process-
switching or state-transition is defined as Rt''~'.
3.2. The Concept of Bayesian Probability Learning.
In order to infer process-switching, economic agents use Bayesian
techniques. In the Bayesian multi-process Kalman filter a combination
of prior information and sample information is used to calculate and
update the probabilíty distribution of the alternative process models
via Bayes' law. This updating process is referred to as 'Bayesian
learning' and closely resembles the Bayesian probability learning with
regard to the reputation of policymakers in the models of Backus d
Driffill [(1985a1. (1985b)] and Barro (1986b1.71
According to Bayes' theorem the conditional posterior probability
TTt1'~' can be separated into prior i nformation and sample information
by employing the Markov properties of the observable process. Thus, the
probability Tft''" can be calculated as:
1211 P1P0~. ~ Mt~' . Mt'i ~ (Pt,Pt-1'Dt-2~...) ]
~ii~ PRQB. [ Mt-1 ~ (Pt-1'pt-2'pt-3~...) ]
~ PRQB. ~ DL ~ (Dt-1'Dt-2'pt-3~...) ] .
PRU~. ~ Dt ~ Mt~' . Mt'1 ,(Pt-1'Pt-2'pt-3~...) ]
' PR08. [ Mt~~ ~ Mtli , (PL-1'pt-2'Pt-3~...) ]
The first term i n equation (22) represents the value of the likelihood
function Lt''~' for observation pt conditional on the specification of
---------------------------------------
7) See also Driffill (1988b) for this interpretation of my approach to
modelling reputation and credibility in Weber (1988d1.
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model Mt'' ". It is determined by the recursive residuals of the Kalman
filter iteration of model Mtt'~' - that is, by the one-period
prediction errors et''~` and their variance Ft''~' according to:
ct.1t z ~t.1t -~t~z~ it.]t z 2 tt.,f~l22) Lt -[2n a Ft ] exP [-{let 1 ~2a Ft } 1,
where 'exp' characterizes the exponential function. The second term in
equation (22) describes the prior probability attached to model j
[Mt~`] before the observation of pt in period t. This prior probability
is denoted by Et-l~t~~- The third term in equation (22) is the
posterior probability attached to model i(Mt''" J in period t-1
conditional on the observation of pt 1 and is denoted by RL'i. The last
term in equation (22) is the common denominator of all probabilities
TTtI'~` and represents a normalizing constant:
(23) f E Tft1'~t - 1 .
The normalized posterior probabilities Tit''~` can thus be written as:
1241 nci,~i - k Lti..1t E ili~t rttiit t t t-1 t t-1 '
and reDresent the relative probability (weight) of the individual
process model Mt''~' within the overall model Mt. These relative weights
depend in Bayesian tradition on both sample information, as captured by
the performance indicator of the likelihood function Lt''~` of model
TI"' and the posterior probability [Tl"`) of the process models M"~t t-1 t-1'
and on prior information as reflected by the prior probability [Et-1~tJ
of model Mt~t.
The prior information conveyed by the probabilities iTt''" in
equation ( 25) is determined subject to the numerical values of the
prior and posterior probabilities Et-1Rt~` and Tft'i.
The posterior probability TTt'i of a process i in period t-1 is
defined as:
(25) nttt , E II~t.~t .t-1 ~ t-i
and represents the probability - conditional on the realization Pt-1 -
that model i describes the observable p~~ocess in period t-1.
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A second posterior probability, which can be calculated from last
period's process probabilities Rtli~', is the posterior probability
pt~l' and represents the probability - conditional on the realization
pt-1 - that model j describes the observable process in period t-2:
1261 ~~~ i~.s~~t-1 - f nt-1 ~
This second posterior probability is used to calculate the new prior
probability Et-1Rt~~ of the process model j for period t given all
information up to but not including period t. Applying Bayes' law, the
prior probability Et-lptl~ can be derived as the normalized sum of both
last period's prior probability [E TT~~'] and the posteriort-2 t-1
probability TTt~l [-i nt~ll~] of process model j according to:
(27) Et-1TTt"
E if`~~ . f Tf`~.i~t-2 t-1 i t-1
i~~ i~.i, 'I( Et-1Bt-1 } i Dt-1 1
This transformation of old prior and posterior probabilities into a new
posterior probability for the subsequent period represents the Bayesian
learning mechanism, and is determined by the relative performance of
the individual models over the most recent periods.
3-3. 1Te Reputation of Policywakers
It is now possible to define the policymaker's reputation for being
'hard-nosed' (h) or 'wet' (w) as a modified version of the measures put
forward ín Backus b Driffill [(1983a1, (1983b1], Barro (19851.
The reputation of a policymaker for being hard-nosed is taken to be
the probability that the observable price level series pt exhibits only
transitory or permanent level shocks over time, and is given by:
~ ~~~ i~.ii
(28) Rt - Et-111-qt) - ~Et(
Et-2Bt-1 t f Dt-11 1
~ ~
j ( Et-lpt-1 ; F pt-1 ]
Thus, the reputation of a policymaker is related to the Bayesian
learning mechanism of the public as modelled by the multi-process Kalman
filter and depends on the relative forecasting performance of both the
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level and first difference stationary price determination models.
Similarly, the policymaker's reputation for being wet and allowing
non-stationary inflation rate behaviour is defined as:
~ i~i c~.i~
(29) Rw - E - ~Fal Et-28t 1 4 i nt-1t t-l4t i ( E Tl~~' . i Il'~."~ t-1 t-1 i t-1
1
1
The time-varying estimates for these measures of a government's
reputation for being 'hard-nosed' and fighting inflation, or for being
'wet' and allowing for inflation, are presented below for all 8 EMS
member countries and for some major non-member countries such as the
United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.
4. The E~pirical Evidence on the E?IS-Credibility F{ypothesis.
4.1. Reputation and E?i5 Ile~bership.
As stated in the introduction, the German Bundesbank is usually
assigned a high reputation for anti-inflation policies at the onset of
the EMS, while the central banks of high-inflation countries such as
France and Italy on the other hand are viewed to have had a low
reputation for strict adherence to anti-inflation policies. If the EMS-
reputation hypothesis were true, the counterinflation reputation of the
non-German EMS countries, such as France and Italy, should have
increased during the EMS period. Table 1 presents the empirical
evidence on this hypothesis:
Tab. 1.: Esti~ated reputation for being ' hard-nosed' and adopting an
'inflation first strategy'.8)
65.I-87.IV 65.I-71.1 71.II-79.I 79.II-87.IY
6erwany 0. 88 (0 .13) 0.72 (0 .131 0. 96 (0. 021 0.91 (0. 08)
France 0. 61 (0 .16) 0.69 10 .121 0. 54 (0. 20) 0.61 10. 13)
Italy 0. 64 (0 .13) 0.58 (0 .07) 0. 60 (0. 12) 0.71 (0. 13)
Netherlands 0. 85 10 .14) 0.67 (0 .10) 0. 90 (0. 11) 0.93 (0. 07)
Belgium 0. 69 (0 .18) 0.66 (0 .11) 0. 56 (0. 16) 0.83 (0. 14)
Luxe~bairg 0. 67 (0 .15) 0.59 (0 .08) 0. 78 (0. 12) 0.62 (0 .14)
Denwark 0. 78 (0 .11) 0.70 (0 .12) 0. 76 (0. 091 0.85 (0 .07)
Ireland 0. 75 (0 .11) 0.69 (0 .11) 0. 80 (0. 08) 0.75 (0 .11)
B) The numbers in parenthesis are standard-deviations of the estimates.
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Among the EMS member countries the reputation measures for the overall
period (1965.I-1987.IV) are highest for Germany (0.88) and the
Netherlands (0.85) and lowest for France (0.61) and Italy (0.641. In
the three sub-periods of the Bretton-Woods era 11965.I-1971.1191, the
more freely floating pre-EMS period (1971.II-1979.1) and the recent EMS
period (1979.11-1987.IV1, Germany's reputation is highest in the second
sub-Deriod and falls significantly during the EMS period. On the other
hand, the reputation measures for the two large high-inflation
countries, France and Ita1y, and the two small high-inflation countries,
Denmark and Belgium, increase considerably during the EMS period, while
the reputation measure for the 'hard-currency' country Holland increases
only slightly. Thus, with the exception of Luxembourg1o) and
Irelandlll, the reDutation of most non-German EMS countries has
increased, while Germany's reputation for strict anti-inflation policies
has declined slightly in the EMS period. The former result is in line
with most of the literature on the EMS-credibility hypothesis and
suggests that the EMS has in fact provided an easy way for the (pre-EMS)
high-inflation and low-reputation countries France, Italy, Belgium and
Denmark to establish some reDUtation for an anti-inflation stance and to
gain counterinflationary credibility by locking into the German anti-
inflation policies. The second result, which suggests that the (pre-
EM5) low-inflation and high-reputation country Germany has lost some of
its initial reputation, supports the concern of Gleske (19871, who fears
that at present in Germany exchange rate considerations are given too
much weight in the formulation and implementation of monetary
policy.12) Both matters are dealt with below in some more detail.
óerwany's Reputation.
To explaín the decline ín the reputation measure for Germany, some
comments are in order about the way in which the Bayesian multi-process
Kalman-Filter algorithm works. For this purpose, the time-paths of the
probabilities of the four alternative Drocess models for the German
consumer price level are displayed in Fig. la and Fig. lb.
.......................................
9) This ranking is not affected when the pre-EMS period ís chosen to be
1973.[I-1979.II.
10) The existence of a currency union with fixed parity between Luxembourg
and Belgium does not prevent national differences in price level
movements and hence in the reputation measures derived here.
11) The traditional 1:1 link of the Irish and the British Pound was
suspended when Ireland entered the EMS and Britain chose to not
participate in the ERM of the EMS.
12) See Gleske (19871, pp. 21,22 for this interpretation.
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As outlined in the appendix, all four process models are
initialized for each country in 1965.I1 with identical probabilities of
Tit~'-0.25 (j-1,2,3,41. Since the sum of the probabilities of the two
process models with either purely temporary or purely permanent level
shocks (Fig. la) represents the reputation measure, an initial
reputation of Rt-0.5 is implied for each country.
As can be seen from Fig. la and Fig. lb, the probability of the
model with purely permanent level shocks (model B) increases more or
less continuously throughout the sample, while the probability of the
model with transitory level shocks (model A) fluctuates around its
initial value until early 1983 and falls rapidly thereafter. In
addition, there is an apparent inverse symmetry between the
probabilities of the transitory and permanent level shock models up to
early 1983, especially in the floating exchange rate period from
1973.I1-1979.II. This symmetry breaks down in 1983. Furthermore, the
probabilities of the permanent second and third difference shock models
in Fig. lb decrease continuously until 1979.II. Coinciding with the
onset of the EMS, the probability of the permanent inflation shock model
increases slightly in the 1979.I1 to 1983.1 period and greatly
thereafter. Finally, German consumer price data clearly indicates that a
model with third difference shocks has littie empirical relevance,13)
However, Fig. lb shows that the onset of the EMS caused a major
structural change in the degree of difference-stationarity of consumer
prices as reflected by the probabilities of the alternative models.
Increases in the probability TTt" of the model with permanent first
difference shocks (model C1, which captures permanent changes in the
inflation rate, negatively affect the reputation [Rt-1-Tft`'-Tft '] of
each country. For Germany, the probability Ilt`' (reputation Rt) in
Fig. 1 exhibits four major permanent increases (decreases) towards the
sample end. The first small permanent increase in Tit`' occurs after14)
the onset of tlie EMS in 1979.I15) and the second rise is observed just
.......................................
13) This is not true for the price data of high inflation countries.
14) Due to the adaptive nature of the multi-process Kalman filter, a
change in the structure of the underlying time series is reflected
in a change of the models' probabilities with a one-period lag.
15) Hellwig d Neumann (1987) argue that the Bundesbank's deliberate
overshooting of monetary targets in 1978 had contributed to a re-
kindling inflation and to lessening its credibility. Given the
time-lags in the transmission of monetary policy on prices this
view is compatible with the results presented here.
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after the federal elections in March 1983, which were followed by a
revaluation (~S.SX) of the mark within the EMS.16) There is a more There
is a more transitory increase in Rt`' after 1984.I[[171, and was
foilowed by a large permanent increase in Rt`' after the revaluation
(f2Y.) of the mark in the April 1986 EMS realignment. While the 1983 and
1986 increases of the probability are due to high deflationary outliers,
the late 1984 increase in the probability Rt`~ is caused by a large
inflationary outlier in the German consumer price series. Owing to the
mean-squares properties of the Bayesian multi-process Kalman filter,
these two types of outliers are treated symmetrically and an increase in
the mean-squares prediction-errors of the transitory and permanent
prediction-errors of the transitory and permanent price level shock
models result in a decline in anti-inflation reputation. This is in
line with the approach taken by Meltzer [119841, (19851, (1986a1,
(1986b1. 11986c1, (1987a1, (1987b)], who implicitly relates credibility
to a decline in the variance of the prediction-errors. In Perry (19831.
Blanchard (1984) and Christensen [11987a). (1987b1, (19881]. however,
positive and negative price level prediction-errors are treated
asymmetrically and increases in anti-inflation credibility are
explicitly related to lower than expected prices and hence negative
errors. In this concept, a drastic and unexpected sharp disinflation
establishes credibility, whereas in the present context only gradual
disinflation policies enhance reputation. Given the limitation that
expectations are backward-looking within the context of an expectations
augmented Phillips curve, the choice made in the present study is
consistent with the views of Collins (1987), who notes: "More
disinflation is not necessarily a good thing. In fact, welfare is higher
under less deflationary EMS regimes than under the most deflationary
non-cooperative regime" [Collins (19871, p. 291. This need not
necessarily be the case if price expectations are formed in a rational,
forward-looking manner by using relevant economic information contained
in long-run interest rates, forward exchange rates or interest rate
differentials between countríes. Thus some doubts about the decline in
the German reputation measure at the sample end are justified.
.......................................
16) In Dudler (1984) and Eggerstedt 3 Sinn (1987) it is argued that the
large-scale official intervention before the realignment caused a
massive increase in bank liquidity in the Federal Republic and the
Bundesbank feared losing its control over the money supply.
17) This can be attributed to the tax reform related increase in value-
added tax as well as the inflationary effects of higher disposable
incomes.
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However, it cannot be overlooked that all major changes in
reputation occurred in politically sensitive time-periods and were
largely caused by external events ( dollar appreciation 1981.II-1985.I
and depreciation 1985.II-1986.IV, oil price falll, political events
(strikes, elections) and the federal government's policies
(revaluations, consolidation of the budget) and to a much lesser extent
by the monetary policy actions of the German Bundesbank, despite the
fact that transfers to the government of Bundesbank profits, accumulated
during the dollar appreciation, might have partially undermined the
Bundesbank's anti-inflation stance.18) In Hellwig d Neumann (1987)
German economic policy is interpreted as a game between three
independent pleyers - the federal governmant, the Bundesbank and the
public. Assuming that two of these playars - the Bundesbank and the
public - did not fundamentally change their position after 1982,19) this
leaves the federal government as the player, whose policy actions have
caused the decline in anti-inflation reputatíon.
France's Reputation.
In Fig. 2 the reputation measure for France is plotted together
with the corresponding measure for Germany. During the 1970s and 1980s
France's reputation for anti-inflation policies is consistently higher
than Germany's and the recent decrease in Germany's reputation is
relatively modest in size compared to the substantial fluctuations in
France's reputation throughout the Deriod. Mith respect to the EMS-
credibility hypothesis, the time-path of the French reputation measure
suggests the following:
Given the initial value of Rt-0.5, France's reputation increases
initially, but falls short of the increase in Germany's reputation
after the devaluation of the French franc in November 1969. The French
reDutation measure rises slightly with the move to free floating ín
March 1973, and then falls drastically after the occurrence of the
first oil price shock in June 1973 and France's withdrawal from the
.......................................
18) Malter (19821, p. 46, argues rightly that measured prices are
influenced by monetary policy, but also distorted by tax measures (YAT
increasesl, passing through characteristics of the price system (wage
increase impacts) and the degree of openess, i.e. both the import and
oil price dependency of the economy (revaluation and foreign inflation
impactsl. In the absense of major changes in monetary policy, changes
reputation therefore have to be attributed to these factors above.
19) See Hellwig d Neumann (19871, p. 476 for this interpretation.
- 22 -
'snake' in January 1974. it reaches its minimum in mid 1976. France's
reputation for anti-inflation policies exhibits an upward jump after the
policy switch from the expansionary (reflationary) policies of prime
minister Jacques Chirac to the (deflationary) stabilization policies of
the Barre Plan under prime minister Raymond Barre in late 1976. Under
the Barre plan the French central bank adopted a more stringent monetary
policy than previously, aiming at a control of monetary expansion and
adopting official monetary (M2) targets. Even though money growth was
stabilized at an average of 12.5 percent, growth objectives were
exceeded in every year except in 1980, the year which shows the highest
measure of reputation in the entire Barre period.20) Furthermore, in
contrast to the evidence for Germany, the onset of the EMS in March 1979
has little initial effect on the French reputation measure.21)
After the socialist Mitterand's election as President of the
Republic in May 1981, there is an initial sharp temporary decline in
France's reputation for tight monetary policy. However, the socialist
government continued to control monetary growth by using the same
techniques as its predecessor and in 1982 stressed the reduction of
inflation as the main policy aim, with targets for M2 growth of 10
percent in 1982 and 8 percent in 1983. In addition, prices and wages
were frozen from June until the end of October 1982 and the freeze was
gradually phased out over 1983. These policy measures explain the strong
increase in reputation during 1982 and early 1983 following the initial
decline in 1981. It should, however, be noted that this reputation gain
reflects the existence of strict short-term inflation control rather
than a reduction in the underlying inflation trend. This is seen in the
drastic decline in the reputation measure as the price freeze was
gradually phased out at the end of 1982 and in early 1983.
The devaluation (-2.5X) of the French franc in the March 1983
realignment and the austerity programme introduced under prime minister
Pierre Mouroy shortly afterwards indicate a new policy regime in France
20) It should be noted that the present applicatíon does not use monetary
the reputation measures. Such information will, however, be included in
a subsequent paper, which aims at the empirical quantification of the
theoretical credibility measures derived in Cukierman 8 Meltzer [11983)
(1986a1, (1986b1, (1986c)]. See also Hardouvelis 8 Barnhard for a simi-
lar, less formal concept of the credibility of monetary announcements.
21) This is consistent with the evidence reported in Collins (19871, who
states for France: "While joining the EMS may have altered the rules of
the game, it had little initial impact...on the credibility of the high
inflation goverment. Changes in credibility...came a few years later"
- 23-
involving strict foreign exchange controls and a tightening of fiscal
and monetary policy. These restrictive policies have, however, not
resulted in a permanent increase in France's reputation measure, which
after mid 1983 is seen to fluctuate around a slightly negative trend and
exhibits large temporary changes after the two realígnments in June 1985
(t2Y.) and April 1986 (-3~1.
Summarizing, it can be stated that the temporal development of
France's reputation for counterinflation policies is influenced by two
main factors: firstly, reputation depends largely on domestic economic
policies, such as the Barre plan and the price freeze under President
Mitterand. This result is not surprising, since France - as one of the
larger EMS member countries - after 1979.II continued to pursue
independent domestic policy targets, such as M2-growth, in addition to
the official EMS exchange rate targets. Secondly, reputation is
affected by the EMS-realignments, which corresponded to permanent shocks
in the level of the prices of imported goods in units of domestic
currency (ètPtl, and resulted in a temporary increase in the probability
of the permanent price level shock model (model BI and hence in
reputation.22)
Italy's Reputation.
The time-path for the reputation measure of Italy, which after
France and Germany is the third largest EMS country, is depicted in Fig.
3. It is interesting to note that the three periods of monetary
restriction of 1974, 1976-1977, and the last one starting in 1980,
which are analysed in Caranza and Fazio 119831, can be clearly
identified in Fig. 3 by an increase in anti-inflation reputation. During
the late 1960's and early 1970's [taly's reputation measure fluctuates
slightly above its initial value until late 1973 and is little affected
by the first oil price shock in June 1973. Under the restrictive
policies of 1974, which included the adoption of total domestic credit
(TDC) as the intermediate target for monetary control, reputation
reaches its highest pre-EMS value. The (expansionary) lifting of bank
22) Since realignments represent some adjustment for cumulated past
inflation differentials between EMS countries, this increase in
reputation can be justified on the grounds that realignments provide
high-inflation EMS countries with the chance for a politically feasable
turnaround to anti-inflation policies. Such 'scapegoat' arguments are
put foreward in Eggerstedt d Sinn (19871, p. 17.
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credit ceilings March 1975 and their (contractionary) reintroduction in
late 1916 show up as drastic decllnes and increases in the reputation
measure. Thereafter, reputation declines until late 1979. In response to
the second oil price shock in mid 1979 monetary policy became
restrictive again towards the end of 1979 and remained restrictive
throughout 1980.231 As a result, reputation is observed to
increase sharply and temporarily in early 1980, and fluctuate strongly
thereafter. This result is consistent with the findinqs of Caranza b
Fazio (1983) that the restrictive monetary policies in 1980 were "less
effective, or less rapid...in slowing down domestic demand and
inflation. The reasons for this slower and weaker effect are...the
extent and persistence of inflationary expectations." [Caranza b Fasio
(1983), p. 80]. A more permanent increase in reputation is, however,
achieved after the devaluations (-6X) of the Italian lira in the March
1981 realignment and the so-called 'divorce' between the Bank of Italy
and the Treasury in July 1981, which established a new technique for
financing the treasury.24) After mid 1981, all three devaluations of the
Italian lira in the October 1981 (-3X1. June 1982 (-2.75X) and March
1983 (-2.SX) realignments can be identified as temporary increases in
reputation for reasons explained above. Reputation then falls
temporarily with the move to more market-orientated instruments of
monetary control, such as the lifting of ceilings on bank loans in June
1983, and fluctuates thereafter. Finally, after the latest lira
devaluation (-6X) in the June 1985 realignment Italy's reputation
measure reaches its highest ever value and subsequently shows a
remarkable synchronization in both level and time-development with the
German reputation measure.
Summarizing this evidence, it can be stated that Italy's reputation
measure was lower than France's during the late 1960's and early
1970's, but was less affected by the first oil price shock in June 1973.
In addition, Italy entered the EMS with a lower reputation than France
in March 1979. During the EMS period Italy's reputation has exhibited a
clear upward trend and convergence to the German reputation measure,
especially with the move to restrictive monetary policies in 1980 and
after the March 1981 realignment, while France's reputation has
.......................................
23) See Caranza and Fazio (1983) for a more detailed analysis of Italian
monetary policy.
24) In Juli 1981 the practice whereby the Bank of Italy took up the govern-
ment securities not Dlaced with the Dublic or banks was terminated.
See Caranza and Fazio (19831 and Tabelilini (1987) on this point.
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fluctuated stationarily around its pre-EMS value. Finally, France's
reputation for anti-inflation policies at the end of 1987 was still
considerably lower than that of Italy or Germany. Thus, although there
is some evidence on a convergence between the estimates of Germany's
and Italy's reputation in their commitment to fight inflation, the
evidence for France denies the existence of such a convergence. Further
evidence from the smaller EMS countries is therefore required to
evaluate the EMS-credibility hypothesis.
The smaller EMS countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and
Denmark, traditionally place a higher weight on external stability and
can therefore be expected to have 9ained more than the larger countries
France and Italy from the provision of a'hard currency' option within
the EMS. These gains in reputation can be expected to be higher for
Belgium and Denmark, which prior to the EMS were typically referred to
as high-inflation countries with low anti-inflation reputation, than for
the Netherlands, where reputation for tight monetary policies is
generally agreed to have been already high prior to the EMS.
Holland's and Belgiw's Reputation.
It is instructive to discuss the two Benelux countries first. The
time-paths of the reputation measure are displayed in Fig. 4 for
Belgium and in Fig. 5 for Holland, both in comparison with Germany.
During the Bretton Woods system and the early 1970's the reputation
measures for both countries show a striking similarity. After an initial
increase in 1966 both measures decline until late 1969. In October 1969
the German mark was revalued. Since a revaluation of the currency of
both countries' main trading partner is equivalent to a permanent price
level shock - via the price increase of imported goods - both reputation
measures increase sharply for reasons explained above and decline again
thereafter. After the institution of the 'snake', the joint exchange
rate agreement between Germany, France, the Benelux countries and
Denmark in April 1972, and the move to joint floating in February 1973,
the two reputation measures for Belgium and Holland lose their initial
similarity.
The Dutch reputation measure increases drasticaily after 1973.1 and
is almost identical with the reputation measure for Germany from 1975.I
to 1979.1. Furthermore, the onset of the EMS in March 1979 has little
- 2 6 -
initial effect on the apparent symmetry between Germany's and Holland's
reputation measures. After the revaluation (.2X) of the German mark in
the first EMS-realignment of September 1979, the Outch reputation
measure falls below that of Germany This relative position is not
affected by the two realignments of October 1981 and June 1982, which
left the bilateral exchange rate of both currencies unaltered. However,
the revaluations of the Dutch guilder (43.SX) and the German mark
(.5.5X) in the March 1983 realignment, which implied a devaluation of
the guilder relative to the mark, contributes to a sharper decline in
Dutch relative to German reputation after March 1983. Finally, after
late 1984 the Dutch and the German reputation measures follow different
time-paths. This is due to the marked decline in the probabilities TTt`~
and Rta~ of the models with permanent first and second difference shocks
(model C and D) for Holland, which are depicted in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b,
as compared with the increase of the probability iTt`~ for Germany.
There are several factors i nvolved here. Firstly, the sharp rise of
the dollar in late 1984 and especialiy in early 1985, which affected
the mark more than any other EMS currency, resulted in a sharp rise in
the prices of imports and energy and led to the strong increase in
German consumer prices in early 1985. Given the smaller dependency of
Holland on energy imports due to its North Sea gas industry, which in
1983 accounted for 7.3 per cent of Dutch GNP, Dutch consumer prices
increases were much smaller i n late 1984 and early 1985. Secondly, after
the interventions of other EMS members in support of the mark, the Dutch
guilder weakened somewhat relative to the mark. In February 1985 the
interest rate differential between Holland and Germany jumped from
virtually zero to 1.5X i n February 1985, reflecting expectations of a
devaluation of the guilder relative to the mark. However, the EMS
realignment i n June 1985 left the exchange rate between the guilder and
the mark unaffected as the mark strengthened relative to the dollar. As
a result of all these factors, Holland's transition to low - and in 1986
slightly negative -inflation rates was much smoother than the German
deflation.251
25) In Germany there was a sharp price increase in 1985.[, very low infla-
tion over the rest of 1985, deflation in 1986 and a reflation again
in late 1986 and early 1987. In Holland, inflation was low and almost
constant after late 1984 and slightly only negative in 1986.
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In summary it can be said that the reputation gains from a'hard-
currency' option for Holland were clearly obtained by committing
monetary policy to a level pegging of the Dutch guilder with the German
mark at the onset of the European 'snake' in 1973 and the continuing of
this commitment with the setting up of the EMS in 1979.
The Belgian reputation measure does not rise with the onset of the
European 'snake' in 1973. On the contrary, the Belgian reputation
measure declines sharply during 1974, when the Belgium experienced
massive wage increases26) and high inflation, partiy caused and
aggravated by the Belgian system of wage-indexation. The attempt of the
Belgian government in 1976 to bring wages and inflation under control
shows up as a temporary increase in the reputation measure, which
declines again after the government was obliged to resign in 1977. The
picture then changes considerably with the onset of the EMS in March
1979. Between March 1979 and the end of 1981, the German 'period of
grace' for the EMS according to Dudler (1984), the Belgian reputation
measure increases sharply and converges to the German reputation
measure. This rise in reputation is brought to a halt by the first
devaluation (-8.5Y.) of the Belgian franc in the February 1982
realignment, which was followed by temporary wage and price freezes.
Finally, since 1982 there has been an apparent and striking similarity
in the time-development of the Belgian and German 1982 and the clear
commitment to a level pegging policy for the Belgian franc vis-a-vis the
German mark.
Denwark's Reputation.
Finally, Fig. 10 displays Denmark's reputation for pursuing 'anti-
infiation' policies. In the late Bretton Woods system this reputation
measure follows a similar time path to those of Holland and Belgium.
Like the Belgian reputation, Danish reputation declines sharply after
the move to generalized floating in February 1973 and the first oil
price shock in June 1973. Reputation fluctuates strongly during 1975
and 1976 but rises again in 1977 and 1978.
At the onset of the EMS, the Danish reputation measure is
relatively high, but clearly still much lower than that of Germany or
.......................................
26) During 1974-1977 Belgian wages rose by 73.5X compared with the EEC
average of 68.SY. and Germany (39~) and Holland (57Y.), the two main
trading partners of Belgium (40Y, of total exports and importsl. See
Stokx (19821, p. 52.
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Holland, and it declines slightly in mid 1979. Despite the two
transitory increases in reputation, firstiy after the election of the
new Social-Democratic Government in October 1979, which was followed by
a short-term price freeze and a second devaluation in November 1979, and
then again after the Government's re-election in December 1981, the
reputation measure shows no upward trend in the initial EMS period. This
is consistent with the view put forward by Christensen (1987a1, that the
disinflation policies of the first government, which did not interfere
in the two-year wage neyotiations, were unsuccessful and did not result
in a gain in reputation.
The second EMS phase can be characterized by the election of the
Liberal-Conservative government in October 1982, which resulted in an
apparent policy switch. Reputation rises slightly after April 1982,
when the government limited the maximum annuai wage increase to 4X, and
then rapidly, exhibiting a clear upward trend after April 1985, when
the government enforced a legal upper-limit for wage increases of 2X.
This result i s again consistent with the findings of Christensen
(1987a1, who derives that the disinflation policies of the second
government were much more effective than the disinflation policies under
the former government. Furthermore, the above findings support the views
of Artis ( 19811 and Artis S Miller (19871, who suggest that Denmark
appears to have used the EMS initially more as a crawling peg271 and
only later moved to a more strongly counterinflationary stance by
pursuing level pegging policie5. Finally, it is worth noting the
similarity between the time-paths of the Danish and Dutch reputation
measures after early 1985.
4.2. Reputation and Monetary Irdependence.
Before presenting any conclusions on the validity of the EMS-
credibility hypothesis, a comparison of the above time-paths of the EMS
members' reputation with the corresponding measures for some major non-
EMS countries will be carried out. The estimates of reputation for the
United States, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and Switzerland
together with the German reputation measure are presented in Table 2.
.......................................
27) Artis (1987) defines a crawling peg as an exchange rate arrangement
where inflation is not fully accomodated and realignments are under-
indexed adjustments, that is a xX crawling peg with x~100.
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Tab. 2.: Estiwated reputation for being ' hard-nosed'
'inflation first strategy.
and adopting an
65.1-87.IY 65.1-71.I 71.I1-79-I 79.ti-87.IV
Gerwany 0.88 10.13) 0.72 (0. 13) 0.96 (0. 02) 0.91 (0 .06)
United States 0.40 (0.21) 0.61 10. 09) 0.29 (0. 22) 0.35 (0 .17)
Canada 0.53 (0.10) 0.54 (0. 07) 0.55 10. 11) 0.52 (0 .11)
Japan 0.78 (0.13) 0.66 (0. 13) 0.77 (0. 08) 0.87 (0 .07)
United Kingdan 0.72 10.17) 0.76 10. 14) 0.63 (0. 18) 0.77 (0 .14)
Switzerland 0 72 10.12) 0.72 (0 15) 0.76 (0 .10) 0.70 (0 .10)
As among the EMS countries, Germany's reputation for being 'hard-nosed'
and pursuing 'tight' monetary policies is here again the highest for
the overall period and for the pre-EMS and EMS sub-periods. During the
flexible exchange rates period prior to the EMS the reputation of
Germany (0.96l, Japan (0.77) and Switzerland (0.761 are high, whereas
the reputation of the United States policymakers' is extremely low
(0.291. In addition, while Germany's reputation decreases significantly
during the EMS period (0.911, Japan's reputation increases significantly
(0.871, but is on average still lower than Germany's reputation. Table 2
also shows that the United States' reputation declines significantly
with the move to flexible exchange rates and that Switzerland's and
Canada's reDUtation have fluctuate around mean values of 0.72 and 0.53
respectively. Finally, the United Kingdom's reDUtation is relatively
high throughout the sample and close to that of Switzerland.
United States' Reputation.
Looking at the temporal development of the United States'
reputation measures displayed in Fig. 8, the effects of the collapse of
the Bretton Moods system in 1971.III and the 1973.II oil-induced
inflationary shock, when reputation falls to almost zero, are apDarent.
After the adoption of a policy of monetary target announcements in mid
1975 and the election of President Carter in late 1976, reputation rises
slightly, but declines again with the acceleration of infiation in early
1978 and the second oil price shock in 1979. ReDutation is not affected
by the changes in Federal Reserve policy in October 1979. However, the
change in the Federal Reserve's operating procedures in July 1982 and
the sharp decline in M1 velocity in late 1982 lead to a major permanent
increase in reputation. A similar result is derived in Blanchard
(19841,
- 30 -
who finds no direct credibility effects of the Volcker deflation until
1982 and some evidence of an increase in credibility after 1982.28)
Furthermore, the estimates presented strongly support the views of
Meltzer ( 1986b), who states that "the credibility of monetary policy in
the United States, while perhaps higher now than in the late 1970's is
probably lower than it was during the period of low inflation in the
1960s" [Meltzer ( 1986b1, p. 680].
Japatn's Reputation.
The time-path of Japan's reputation measure in Fig. 9 closely
follows that of Germany up to 1971.:II and remains almost constant
between the end of the Bretton Woods era in 1971.II1 and Japan's move to
free floating in 1973.I. Japan's reputation declines considerably after
the oil price shock in June 1973 and fluctuates strongly in response to
the activist, discretionary policies adopted during the rest of 1973
and 1974, when inflation rates in Japan reached their peak. After the
major change in monetary policy in early 1975, when Japan abandoned most
of the activist policies and moved to a new policy regime with non-
managed exchange rates and pre-announced monetary targets, the
reputation measure shows a clear upward trend. This upward trend is only
once slightly interrupted, when Japan, like the United States,
experienced a large demand shock following President Carter's use of
credit controls in 1980. Finally, ~fter 1980 reputation increases
further and less erratically than before. Thus, the time-path of the
reputation measure for Japan after 1975 is also consistent with the
views of Meltzer (1987a1, that "for Japan, the change in policy
arrangements provided an opportunity to reduce inflation and increase
the credibility of economic policy" [Meltzer (1987a), p. 10].
Britain's Reputation.
The time-path of the United Kingdom's reputation measure is
displayed in Fig. 10. Reputation increases sharply at the start of the
sample and fluctuates around a value of 0.8 until late 1971. With the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the reform of the system of
..-.-~---------..' ......................
28) See Blanchard (1984), p. 213 an this point.
29) On this point see also Meltzer (1987a1, p. 11.
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monetary and credit control in 1973.IiI the reputation measure declines
slightly, but rises again after the move to managed floating in June
1972. Reputation then falls drastically at the end of the Heath period
with the election of the Labour government in February 1974, and
continues to decline until mid 1978. After the election of the
Conservative government under Thatcher in May 1979 the reputation
measure rises again sharply, fluctuates stronqly until mid 1981, but
becomes less erratic and remains higii after the reform of monetary
control technipues in August 1981. Thus, the estimate of reputation here
supports the views of Minford, who states that "Mrs. Thatcher's
government has sunk a good deal of political capital into the creation
of counter-inflation credibility without resort to foreign
entanglements" [Minford (19881, p. 37]. Furthermore, given the fact that
Britain's reputation lately is as high as Germany's, the present results
are also in line with the views of Currie 11988), who states that "the
British government has independently and Dainfully established a sound
reputation for resisting inflation, and it is not clear that EMS
membership will enhance that reputation, especially since realignments
mean that the EMS permits inflation differentials to Dersist, even if it
acts to narrow them" [Currie (19881, p. 3].
5. Su~wary and Conclusions.
The empirical evidence on the EMS hypothesis discussed in this
paper allows a number of important conclusions.
Firstly, the EMS has provided smaller EMS participants, for example
Belgium or Denmark, with an institutional framework to move from high
to low inflation rates, initially by using the system as an
underindexed crawling peg and later by adopting more counterinflationary
level pegging policies. These countries have gained considerable
counterinflation credibility during the EMS period, although for Belgium
the transition period to higher reputation apDears to have been shorter
than for Denmark. Furthermore, in both countries the increase in
reputation is far from being the result of some intrinsic dynamics of
the EMS; the timing of the gains in reputation clearly shows that the
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gains in reputation have been the outcome of deliberate domestic policy
reforms and a stronger commitment to lower inflation rates within the
rules of the EMS. This view is supported by the fact that Holland, which
at the onset of the EMS had the same counterinflation reputation as
Germany, has gained most of its reputation at the start of the European
'snake' arrangement. Thus Holland committed its monetary policy to the
'hard-currency' option provided by the German mark in the 'snake', while
Belgium used the early and Denmark the late EMS arrangement to bring
domestic inflation under control. Hence, if exchange rate pegging
policies are given absolute priority over domestic policy
considerations, the results presented here suggest the validity of the
EMS-credibility hypothesis.
Secondly, with respect to the larger non-German EMS participants,
the evidence from above suggests some gains in counterinflation
reputation for Italy, while the EMS has had no apparent influence on
French reputation. Thus, it is only with respect to Italy the
underindexed EMS realignments seem to have exerted some discipiinary
effects on domestic monetary policy, while for France this would not
appear to be the case. However, this result is not too surprising, given
the considerable degree of foreign exchange controls in both countries,
which have tended to undermine and prevent such disciplinary effects.
Thus, for both France and Italy, some further research, taking the
effects of ezchange controls on reputation into account, is required.
The paper of Giavazzi R Pagona (19851, which relates the existence of
capital controls to on-shore and off-shore interest rate differentials,
provides a useful starting point for such an analysis.
Thirdly, Germany's reputation for counterinflation policies appears
to have been slightly undermined during the EMS period, and theoretical
arguments exist that can explain such a loss in reputation. However,
the special least-squares error type of the signal extraction algorithm
together with the backward-looking expectations formation process used
here may also partly be responsible for this result, especially after
the sharp deflation in 1986. The robustness of this result needs to be
checked by applying other forms of expectation formation processes,
such as forward-looking expectations in connection with an application
of the structural MPKF described in Meber [11988b), (1988d11. Moreover,
a comparison of different concepts of reputation and credibility, such
-33-
as the credibility measures put forward in Cukierman R Meltzer (1986b)
or the prediction error approach taken in Perry (19831, Blanchard (1984)
and Christensen [(1987a1, (1987b1, (198811, may also be used to evaluate
the robustness of the above result.
Finally, the results for the United Kingdom and Japan show that
countries outside the EMS have also been successful in establishing
counterínflation reputation. As within the EMS, the timing of these
gains in reputation is related to major political events, such as
elections, and reforms in economic policies, which have marked the
adoption of a more counterinflationary policy stance. Mhile Japan and
the United Kingdom have been able to pursue such u-turns of policies,
the results above suggest that the United States have been much less
successful in doing so.
In evaluating the overall evidence provided in this paper, it is
worth noting that the reputation measures presented here are fairly
consistent with the majority of views expressed on these issues in the
literature on credibility and reputation. Thus, the measures of
reputation developed in the game-theoretical models of Backus 3
Driffill [11985a1, (1985b1] and Barro 11986) can be viewed as valuable
concepts for empirically evaluating the importance of credibility and
reputation in real world policy making. The Dresent paper showes that
reputation effects have been important in the conduct of the
counterinflation policies, especially for the smaller EMS countries.
However, since this paper takes a new approach to estimating
credibility, the robustness of the results need to be checked and the
demand for further research along the lines indicated above is
pressing.
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Fig. 4: Reputation weasures for 'counterinflation' policies
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6. Appendix: Description of the Bayesian Multi-Process Kalman Filter
The time series version of the state-space model which correspond to
the ARIMA 10,3,3) time series model is given by:
(la)
Ilb)
yt - zT at t S vt , E(vt)-O,Elvtvt)-azH ,
at - T at-1 ' R wt , Elwt)-O,Elwtwtl-a~0 ,
with fixed system vectors zT, S and matrices T, R, H and 0. The vectors
of error-terms vt and wt are independently normally distributed with
mean-vector zero and constant finite variance-covariance matrices a2H
and aZ0 respectively. In addition, the unobservable state vector at of
the state-space model is assumed to be normally distributed:
(2) at - at - Ot M N( 0, oZ Pt ).
The scaling term a2 from the measurement equation is introduced into
the definition of the estimator of the state vector's variance-
covaríance matrix a~Pt in order to ensure the independence of the Kalman
filter algorithm from the process variance aZ,30)
6iven a suitable initalization of the Kalman filter, the projection
of the unknown state vector at and its variance-covariance matrix Pt can
be determined recursively by applying the Kalman filter algorithm under
the following specification of the system vectors and matrices:
bt 1 ~~tptt OitOzt OitO~t
at - gt Pt - z E ~zt0it OztOzt OztO~t 'a
dt ~3t~it O~t~zt 03t0~t
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
zt - ~1 0 O J , Tt-T- 0 1 1 , Rt-R- 0 1 10 0 1 0 0 1
.......................................
30) See Harvey ( 1981b), p. 107 for this argument in the context of Kalman
filter estimation of standard regression models.
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qn 0 0 nt
St-S- [1] , Ht-H- [hv] , Ot-O- 0 qr 0 wt - rt .
0 0 qs st
This specification of the Kalman filter follows Harrison d Stevens
( 19711, Bomhoff d Korteweg ( 19801, Bomhoff [119821, 119831], Kool (1982)
and Bomhoff d Kool ( 1983) in introducing a common factor in all variance
terms of the stochastic processes according to a~-azhv, a~-a2qn,
ar-oZqr and a5-ozqs.
The specification of the multi-process filter assumes that four
alternative process models are sufficient to cover the range of
possible stochastic patterns of the time serias to be predicted.
Specifically, it is postulated that the four alternative models differ
only in the specification of the variances a~, a~, o~ and as of the
dynamic linear model 130a) to (30d1, or in the specification of the
moving-average parameters d~, d2 and d~ and the process variance oX of
the corresponding time series model. [n the formal presentation of the
model each alternative model will be characterized by a superscript j
(with j-1,2,3,41. and differs only in the error term variances [o~~~',
a~'~', a~~~', as~~']. Furthermore, for each point in time t[with
t-(1,2,...,N1] each model has a certain probability Tft~' and can be
completely described by the estimates of the state vector at~' and its
variance-covariance matrix Pt~'.
The overall estimate of the state vector at and its variance-
covariance matrix Pt in the multi-process Kalman filter is then given
by a probability-weighted normal distribution according to:
(3) at - f TIt~' N( at" , a~ Pt~' ).
where ift~' is the posterior probability that model j describes the
observable process yt in period t.
It is assumed that the observable process yt-1 in period t-1 is
described by model í[denoted by Mt'i for all 11-1,2,3,41] and the
process y in period t is represented by model j[denoted by Mt~' for
all j1-1,2,3,41]. In order to capture the possibility of such process-
switching a prediction on the basis of all models i in period t-1 with
the different specification of all models j[denoted by Mt't~i for all
i,j(-1,2,3,4)J is required. The probability of such process-switching
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or state-transition is defined as fltl']'. The relevant Kalman filter
prediction and update equations of the multi-process Kalman filter








- T PI11 TT 4 R O I]1 Rr
t,t-1
(4C)
all.]l - QI1.]1 } Kcl.]1 I1,]1
t,t t,t-1 t
{ et } ,




14e1 ell.]1 - Y - zT acl.]1 .t t t,t-1
(4f) FI1,]1 - zT PI1.]1 z 4 ST HI]1 St t,t-1
14g) KI1.]1 - PI1.]1 zt t,t-1
(FI1.]1~-1
t
As the result of one Kalman fílter iteration in period t sixteen
estimates of the state vector atlt]1 and its variance-covariance
matrix Ptlt]' conditional on the realization of the observable process
yt and the specification of model i in period t-1 [Mtli] and model j in
period t [Mt]'] are calculated and can be characterized by the
conditional density distribution:
151 1]1 I11 I1.]1at ~yt'Mt 'Mt-1 ~ N ( at,t
PI1.]1 ~t,t
The posterior estimate of the state vector at conditional only on the
realization of the observable process yt can then be derived as a
probability-weighted average of these conditional density distributions
according to:
(6) a ly ~ E E II11.J1 N( all.]1 PI1.]1 ~.t t 1] t t,t t,t
where the posterior transition probabilities Tftl']1 are used as a
weighting factor for the posterior estimates atliJl of the different
process models.
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The Bayesian part of the Multi-process Kalman Filter then uses a
Combination of prior information and sample information to calculate
and update the probability distribution of the alternative process
models via Bayes' law. This updating process is referred to as a
'Bayesian learning' Drocess and closely resembles the Bayesian
probability learning used in 8ackus b Driffill [(1985a1, ( 1985b1) and
Barro (1986b1.
According to Bayes' theorem the conditional posterior probability
iTt'']` can be calculated as;31)
(71 nts.]' -
n~i.]~
and can be formalized in terms of the Kalman filter from above as:
(el
PROB. [ Mt]~ . Mt'i ~ (Yt.Yt-1'Yt-2'...) ~
PROB. [ Yt ~ Mt]~ . Mt'1 .(Yt-1'yt-2'Yt-3~...)
~ PR08. [ Mt]~ ~ Mt~i .(Yt-1'yt-2'yt-3~...) 1
,~ ~~ [ Misi I IY Y Y ..) 1t-1 t-1' t-2' t-3 "
~ PRUB. [ Yt ~ (yt-1'yt-2'Yt-3'...) 1.
k Li,.]~ E
Tfi]i D~i~
t - t t t-1 t t-1 '
(9) ~~i.]' - I2n a~ F~a.]i)-~~~zi eXP [-{le'i.7~12~2azF~i.]'} ).t t t t
(10) f E iTt' ' ]' - 1 .
(11) Ti~i` - E Tf`s']' ,t-1 ] t-1
~]i t].ii(121 ~t-1 - i nt-1 '
E TT` ]' . E TT` ] .' `
(13) E Tf` ]' -
t-2 t-1 i t-1
t-1 t i( E Tl`]' . E II`].~~] t-1 t-1 ~ t-1
)
The transformation of old prior and posterior probabilities into a new
prior probability for the subsequent period in equation (A13)
.......................................
31) See also Harrison b Stevens [119711. 119761] and Bomhoff b Kool (19831.
-44-
represents the Bayesian learnin9 mechanism, and is determined by the
relative performance of the individual models over the most recent
periods.
In order to make the forecasting model described above operational,
some sort of condensation procedure ís required. To summarize the state
estimates of the models Mtl'J' in one process model MtJ', the individual
posterior process probabilities TTt''J~ and the condensed posterior
probabilities fltJ' are used as a time-variable weiqhting scheme for the
updated estimates of the state vectors:
(14) a1J) - F RI1.J1 a11.i) I Íf`J` .t 1 t t t
and their variance-covariance matrices:
cJl 11.f1 It.JI 11.J1 lJl 11.,J1 IJ) T IJI1151 Pt - F nt {PL .[lat -at 1 lat -at I 1} i RL ,
where iTtJ'-E Tit1'J' holds. Note that the condensed estimetor for the
variance-covariance matrix PtJI of the state vector atJl in equation
(A15) includes a term [Ia`1'JI-a`JIIla11'J'-a`J11T] in addition to thet t t t
individual estimates Ptl'J'. The reasoning behind this is that the
estimates of the individual variance-covariance matrices Ptl'J~ define
a confidence measure or measure of uncertainty attached to the point
estimates of the state vector at1'JI of the process model Mtl'J1. The
probability weighted sum of these individual estimates of the variance-
covariance matrices thus represents a confidence measure for the point
estimate atJ' of the aggregate model. if, however, the individual point
estimates at''JI differ substantially, then this dispersion of the point
estimates represents an additional element of uncertainty, which wouid
be disregarded using Ptl'JI alone in equation (A151. Thus, this
uncertainty is accounted for by the inclusion of the dispersion term
11.J1 fJl 11,7) 1)1 T[Iat -at Ilat - at 1], which can be neglected for small
differences between the individual and the average point estimates.
t:inally, in our application of the algorithm, the initialization of
the state vector atJ' and its variance-covariance matrix PtJ' is, for









where t is the initalization period, K represents a very targe number0
and I a[3'3] identity matrix. The initalization of the level component
in the state vector using the past actual value of the observable
process together with a very low confidence measure for this
initialization ensures that - due to the special form of the Ricatti
equation (A4dl - a fast convergence of the initial state estimate to the
true sample estimate is guaranteed and simuitaneously the initial
prediction errors are small. In practical data applications K-100000 was
chosen, which resulted in a reduction of the variance of the state
estimate to approximately 0,002 percentage points after processing only
four observations.
In the initíalization of the probabilities of the four different
models the Laplace principle was employed and identical posterior
[Tltó'i] and a-priori probabilities [Eto-lnto'] were assigned:
(18a) Eta-1Rto~ - Eto-18to~ - 0.25 for a11 i,j1-1,2,3,41,
(18b) 8iii - R~i~to-1 to-1 - 0.25 for all i,j(-1,2,3,41.
Hence it is equally likely in the initial period that the government is
'hard-nosed' or a 'wet'.
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